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Governments faced with high inflation and large public sector deficits are
generally more concerned with the recessionary consequences of restoring fis-
cal discipline and of adopting anti-inflationary monetary policies than with the
economic costs in terms of weaker economic growth and undesirable distribu-
tional effects resulting from high budget deficits and inflation. Therefore,
instead of fighting inflation, governments often try to make high inflation
socially tolerable by selective price controls, indexation of minimum wages,
and other interventions. At the same time budget deficits are increasingly fi-
nanced by credits from the Central Bank in order to prevent private demand
from being crowded out by higher interest rates.
Economic history provides some examples of the disastrous effects of persis-
tently financing large budget deficits by printing money. In the 1920s several
European countries experienced as a consequence a dramatic hyperinflation
which could only be stopped by drastic monetary and fiscal reforms (Sargent,
1982). However, these events have not deterred other countries from pursu-
ing inflationary policies either on the pretext of an emergency - e.g. when
governments fear an overthrow if domestic demand were cut effectively - or
in the belief that they can avoid the economic costs of inflation. An out-
standing example provides the economic policy in Argentina, where inflation
has deliberately been used as a means to finance the public sector deficit
over the long term.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the Argentine experience of large
public sector deficits and high inflation, to elaborate the collection and dy-
namics of the inflation tax used to public financing and to identify the eco-
nomic costs of this policy. Strong references are made to the experiences of
other countries during periods of high inflation. Finally, some policy options
are dealt with.
The Public Sector Deficit and Inflation in Argentina
Over the past 20 years the public sector deficit in Argentina has grown con-
siderably. According to Central Bank calculations the deficit of the non-fi-
*
We thank Philippa Dee for helpful comments.nancial public sector has increased from an average of 3 p.c. of GDP in the
second half of the 60s to about 16 p.c. of GDP in the early 80s (Table 1).
These numbers do not include those subsidies implicit in extensive credits to
the private sector by state-owned banks at relatively low interest rates.
Cavallo and Pena (1983) estimated that the deficit including public financial
institutions has risen to more than 20 p.c. of GDP. The data problems are
considerable because information on financial operations of the public financial
sector (Central Bank and associated institutions), especially on interest sub-
sidies and the costs of the large scale financial rescue operations in recent
years, are sketchy or completely lacking. In part, the problem results from
deficient accounting methods. For example, pension payments are credited to
the accounts of the recipients at the beginning of each month, whereas the
corresponding transfer of funds from the public sector to the banking system
is carried out with a lag of several weeks or even months. Therefore reg-
istered expenditures lag behind actual payments. If pension payments had to
be financed properly by bank credit, when they fall due, public expenditures
on interest would be considerably higher. Assuming an interest rate of some
15 p.c. per month accrued interest would accumulate to the initial amount of
the credit in less than 5 months. If, however, such expenditures were fi-
nanced by the Central Bank, the circulation of high powered money would
rise sharply. Notwithstanding the statistical deficiencies the numbers shown in
Table 1 convey a notion of what has happened to the public sector deficit in
Argentina over the last 20 years.
Inflation too, has increased since the mid-60s. In the second half of the 60s
the average annual rate of inflation was about 20 p.c; in 1983 it amounted to
more than 400 p.c. (Table 1). The rate of inflation as well as the public sec-
tor deficit has not risen steadily. From a low point of 2 p.c. of GDP in 1969,
the deficit started to expand in the 70s under the Peronist government and
climbed to 14 p.c. of GDP in 1975. In the following years, when the Martinez
de Hoz administration was in office, it was reduced to about 9 p.c. of GDP,
whereas in 1980 it began to increase again and reached a new peak in 1983
(Figure 1). Inflation exhibits a similar pattern with relatively low rates in
1969 and 1980 and much higher rates in 1975/76 and since 1983 (Figure 1).
The non-financial public sector comprises the central government, the non-
financial state enterprises, and the provincial and municipal governments.Table 1 - Argentina: Public Sector Deficit, Inflation, and Monetary Expansion,
1965-1983




(In per cent of GDP)
Outlays 33.8 34.3 40.5 44.2 51.6 48.6 49.7
Itevenues 30.8 28.8 31.5 36.6 36.0 32.1 33.9
Borrowing
requirements 3.0 5.5 9.0 7.6 15.6 16.5 15.8
Total public sector








circulation 23.7 45.6 183.5 108.6 84.0 189.2 430.5
Mj 25.5 48.4 174.3 97.8 68.5 222.5 307.6
Central government, non-financial state enterprises, provincial and municipal
governments. - Non-financial public sector plus Central Bank and public fi-
nancial institutions. - Annual rate of change in the course of the period. -
Source: BCRA, Cavallo and Pefla (1983), Dornbusch (1984).Figure 1: Argentine: Public Sector Deficits, Inflation, and Money, 1965-1983
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Source: See Table 1An increase in the public sector deficit does not necessarily lead to an ac-
celeration of inflation. The experience in the USA in the first half of the 80s
has shown that a substantial increase of the deficit (in that case from 2 to
6 p.c. of GDP) can even be accompanied by a declining rate of inflation, as
long as monetary policy sticks to a money stock target consistent with a re-
duction of inflation rather than to an interest rate target. The coincidence of
large deficits and galloping inflation in Argentina indicates that the Central
Bank has pursued an accommodating policy or has even directly financed the
budget deficit.
Estimates of the sources of financing the deficit by Cavallo and Pefta (1983)
are given in Table 2. The numbers show that Central Bank credit has always
been heavily used to cover the financing needs of the government. On aver-
age about 60 p.c. of the deficit was financed directly by the Central Bank
during 1970-1983. From 1975 to 1982 some 15 p.c. of total public expenditures
were paid for by issue of new money. In 1983 and 1984 this share rose to
more than 45 p.c, coming close to the ratios which were observed immedi-
ately before or during the hyperinflations in some European countries in the
1920s (Table 3).
During the late 70s and the early 80s - under the Martinez de Hoz and the
Sigaut administrations - a substantial part of the deficit was financed in the
domestic credit market (bank credit and bond sales) and in the international
capital market. This policy helped to reduce inflation from over 400 p.c. in
1976 to about 100 p.c. in 1980. However, "the disinflation was only borrowed
by overvaluation, not earned by a thorough going domestic disinflation"
(Dornbusch, 1984, p. 8). No progress was made in reducing expenditures or
improving tax collection in order to reduce the budget deficit and the funds
borrowed were not invested in such a way as to earn the money (or the for-
eign exchange when credits were denominated in foreign currency) required
to service the public sector debt. Public expenditures labelled as investment
In view of the experience in many countries with fiscal policy in the post-
war period it appears hard to imagine such investment behavior of the pub-
lic sector. This was different in the 19th century. In Prussia, for instance,
the railway which was run by the government contributed strongly to public
revenues (Laaser, 1983, p. 10).Table 2 - Argentina - Financing of the Public Sector Deficit,
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p. 39-78) - Dornbusch
(1984) .Table 3 - Inflationary Public Finance in Selected Countries in
Periods of Hyperinflation
Country Period Percentage of Expenditures Covered
by New Issues of Paper Money
Austria 1919-1922 55.6
Hungary 1920-1924 . 31.8
Poland 1921-1923 54.1
Germany 1920-1924 66.0
Argentina June 82-June 1985 45.0
Sources: Austria, Hungary, Poland and Germany: Sargent (1982);
Argentina: Cavallo and Pefla (1983), BCRA (1983). Own
estimates.
in real assets dropped from about 11 p.c. of GDP in the Martinez de Hoz per-
iod to less than 8 p.c. in the period from 1982-1984.
Since the budget deficit remained persistently high, public sector interest
payments increased from about 2 p.c. of GDP in 1977 to about 12 p.c. in
1982. As a proportion of total public sector outlays, expenditures on interest
amounted to 25 p.c. in 1982; some 70 p.c. of this was related to domestic
public debt. Obviously the interest burden itself was a factor contributing to
the persistence of the budget deficit. In addition, real per capita income in
Argentina had fallen between 1977 and 1982 by some 15 per cent; thus the
income out of which interest and amortization could be paid was much smaller
in 1982 than in 1977. Therefore, the Bignone Government, which took office
in mid-1982, decided to refrain from further expanding its domestic debt.
However, instead of cutting expenditures in order to reduce the deficit the
government relied more heavily on the central bank in financing its deficit
What is worse, a great deal of these outlays were spent in an inefficient
way as is evidenced by the high losses of public enterprises.(Table 2). As regards the external debt, it became increasingly difficult to
make due interest payments in the course of 1982 because of insufficient ex-
port earnings, rising international interest rates, and the appreciation of the
US dollar. In addition, the term structure of foreign debt had seriously dete-
riorated. About 50 p.c. of external loans to Argentina were scheduled for re-
payment in 1983. Since lenders were reluctant to renew the debt, Argentina
was threatened with external insolvency. Needless to say, that under such
circumstances the country was barred from any further access to the interna-
tional capital market.
Thus, from mid-1982, the problem of the budget deficit had to be handled
more or less by a closed economy. The governments had to rely totally on do-
mestic sources in financing the excess of expenditures over revenues. As ex-
ante (planned) private savings were not sufficient to provide the funds need-
ed to finance both private investment and the public sector deficit, and as a
reduction of the deficit did not seem to be opportune for political reasons,
the deficit was financed by issuing new money (Table 2). Indeed the Bignone
Government ruled out an increase in public debt with the private sector in
order to prevent any further increase of public interest payments. The
Alfonsin administration, which came into office at the end of 1983, continued
to finance the public sector deficit by printing new money.
The Collection of the Inflation Tax
From 1970 to 1983 the total public sector deficit amounted to an average of
10.5 p.c. of GDP. That part of the deficit financed directly by the Central'
Bank, was in the order of 6 p.c. of GDP. On average this produced an in-
crease of the monetary base by about 60 p.c. per annum . In 1983, when the
deficit was totally financed by the Central Bank, the increase in high power-
ed money was about twice as large as the monetary base at the beginning of
the year.
It should be noted that the monetary base has not been adjusted for the
introduction of 100 p.c. reserve requirement ratios under the Peronist gov-
ernment and in 1982. In spite of this restrictive measure monetary expan-
sion accelerated strongly because of the deficit induced increase in the
monetary base and ample rediscount facilities provided by the Central Bank.10
Large scale financing of public expenditures by issuing money has led to a
persistently high rate of inflation in Argentina. As long as the deficit-induced
increase of the monetary base was unexpected this had an expansionary effect
on the economy. Private non-banks found themselves holding higher money
balances than they wanted given the volume of planned transactions, the ex-
pected change of the price level, and the cost of holding money. Consequent-
ly, they expanded their demand for interest-bearing financial assets as well
as for goods and services. For a time, thus additional demand led to an ac-
celeration of inflation and a decline in real interest rates.
However, in a country with a long history of inflation such as Argentina,
people can be expected to adjust their expectations to higher rates of infla-
tion after a time. The predominance of short term contracts, frequent price
changes and large-scale indexation gives evidence of this adjustment. In such
an environment, any increase in the money supply which is consistent with
the expected rate of inflation is not likely to have a noticeable impact on real
demand and output. As the excess of public expenditures over ordinary (tax)
revenues does not have an expansionary effect on output in the longer run,
and since the increase in domestic demand cannot be satisfied by higher im-
ports indefinitely, real absorption of the private sector has to be restricted.
The way to achieve this is inflation; the fall of the purchasing power of
money diminishes the spending capacity of the private sector, while at the
same time private net real wealth is reduced and the government's liabilities
in real terms decline. Therefore, inflation operates like a tax on money hold-
ings; for non-interest bearing financial assets (currency and demand depo-
sits) the tax rate is equivalent to the rate of inflation. For deposits which
earn an interest rate less than the rate of inflation, the tax corresponds to
the negative real rate of return. The peculiarity of the inflation tax is that
the revenues are determined in real terms, i.e. by the heap of goods and
services which the government acquires by spending newly issued money, and
that the wealth transfer is realized before tax payments in terms of pur-
chasing power losses are made. Since notes and coins are a liability of the
public sector, the tax on private sector holdings of such assets is directly
collected by the government via a capital gain. The distribution of revenues
from the taxing non-interest bearing demand deposits and deposits with a ne-
gative real rate of return depends on institutional arrangements. With a
private banking sector and a fractional reserve system, the revenues of the11
government are determined by the reserve ratios. Part of the wealth transfer
may remain in the banking sector or, when lending rates are fixed below
market rates, may go to debtors. The latter two cases imply a non-budgetary
subsidization of the banking sector or of debtors which in principle should be
added to public expenditures.
In Argentina, in order to channel inflation tax revenues fully to the govern-
ment, reserve ratios have been kept at or close at 100 p.c. most of the time.
In 1977 during the Martinez de Hoz tenure the Central Bank started to install
a fractional reserve system and introduced the Monetary Regulation Account .
Under this regulation the Central Bank imposed a charge on banks
1 demand
deposit liabilities by which inflation-induced capital gains were transferred
from the banking sector to the Government. In mid-1982 reserve ratios of 100
p.c. were reestablished and there has been little change since then.
Thus on the whole, inflation tax revenues have been fully collected by the
government in Argentina. If we assume that there are no negative real rates
of return on interest bearing deposits the inflation tax is determined by
Ml • p = FM
where p is the rate of inflation and FM is the part of the public sector deficit
which is financed by issuing new money. Accordingly, the rate of inflation
originating from the budget deficit can be expressed as
. _ FM
P " MT
A comparison of the actual rate of inflation and the deficit-induced rate of
inflation suggests that inflationary public finance has been the main cause of
inflation in Argentina (Figure 2).
For a detailed description and analysis of the Monetary Regulation Account
see Fischer, Trapp (1985b).12
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The Dynamics of the Inflation Tax
In view of the poor state of the regular tax collection system in Argentina,
taxation of those who hold money by means of inflation may appear to the
government to be a convenient and efficient way to finance the budget def-
icit: convenient because the tax can be imposed without any kind of parlia-
mentary procedure and efficient because tax revenues accrue automatically
and have not to be collected. Heavy reliance on the inflation tax, however,
will lead to tax evasion, as with any tax whose burden becomes excessive.
The problem arises in this case because the tax base - i.e. the real stock of
money - cannot be controlled by the government. There is ample empirical
evidence that the demand for real money balances declines when the cost of
holding money, i.e. the rate of inflation, increases (Laidler, 1969). Demand
for real money balances would only rise if the public expenditures financed
by newly issued money were expected to promote the growth of aggregate
supply and thus raise income expectations rather than inflation . Experience,
however, gives scant reason to expect such an outcome. In Argentina, public
expenditures have primarily been used for consumption purposes and hardly
for expanding production capacity. An increase of the budget deficit is
therefore more likely to lead to higher costs of holding money. Consequently
firms and households will reduce their desired balances of currency and de-
mand deposits (in real terms) for a given volume of transaction. Thus, al-
though the nominal stock of money continues to rise, money balances in re-
lation to nominal GDP decline when the rate of inflation increases.
In Argentina, the ratio of Ml in real terms to real GDP has dropped from
about 12 p.c. in the early 70s to 7.7 p.c. in 1980 and to some 4 p.c. in 1983
(Table 4) close to levels experienced elsewhere during the hyperinflations of
the 1920s. The adjustment of money balances to the increase in the cost of
holding money has also lead to marked changes in the composition of monetary
aggregates. During the first half of the 70s demand deposits were higher
than currency holdings. Since 1976, however, there has been a steady decline
This fundamental but often ignored point is illustrated by the Laffer-curve
(Canto, Joines and Laffer, 1981).
In this unlikely case the government behaves similar to an honest money
producer (Sjaastad, 1982). The difference, however, is that the income
from public investment is not earned by the government but enhances pri-
vate revenues.Table 4 - Argentina: Liquidity Coefficients
8, Currency-Deposit Ratios and Money Multiplier, 1970-1984
Year Monetary base/GDP M^GDP
Demand deposit Time deposit Money .











































































































aMonetary aggregates deflated by the index of wholesale prices (1970 = 100) and divided by real GDP
at market prices. - Ml/Monetary base. - 1st. Quarter.
Source: BCRA. - FIEL.15
of those deposits relative to currency. The demand deposit-currency ratio fell
from 1.5 in 1976 to 0.8 in 1980 and 0.5 in 1984. At the same time, the time
deposit-currency ratio has increased, probably partly owing to the shift of
funds from demand deposits to time deposits in order to avoid the inflation
tax. The expansion of time deposits was particularly strong when real interest
rates - on average - were positive, i.e. from 1976 to 1981. However, when
the deposit rates were fixed below the rate of inflation holdings of time
deposits declined quickly. This has been the case since 1981. In 1984 the time
deposit-currency ratio was about one third lower than in 1981, indicating that
private households and firms have invested their savings in other kinds of
assets.
A similar reduction of real monetary aggregates could be observed during the
hyperinflations of the 1920s (Sargent, 1982). Both then and now some com-
mentators have argued that the increased note issue of the Central Bank
could not be regarded as the main cause of inflation because of the decline of
the real money stock (Schvarzer, 1983). That argument, however, is falla-
cious; it is turning things upside down. In fact, inflation is the consequence
of expanding the nominal money stock persistently in excess of the growth of
nominal potential output. The attempt to economize on the holdings of a ra-
pidly depreciating money is the result of inflation, but at the same time this
behaviour contributes to the acceleration of inflation because it implies a
shrinking of the tax base. Once inflation rates are very high, the influence
of other determinants of the demand for real money balances, i.e. changes of
real income and interest rates, is comparatively small and can be neglected.
The demand for money simply becomes a function of the inflation rate.
The scatter diagram and the curve in Figure 3 illustrate this relationship for
Argentina.
For a thorough analysis of the inflation tax issue in more theoretical terms
see Sjaastad (1982).16
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Assuming a linear semi-logarithmic relation between Ml (in real terms) and
the rate of inflation p, a regression over the annual data from 1970 to 1984
yields the following equation:





Then inflation tax revenues T are:
T = Ml • p = 139,8 $ - 17,7 In p . p*.
According to this equation tax revenues are maximized at a rate of inflation
(compounded daily rate) of 24.5 p.c. per month. Fernandez and Rodriguez
(1984) alternatively estimate that revenues are maximized at a rate of inflation
From 1970 to 1974 when inflation was relatively moderate real income
changes may have influenced the demand for money noticeably. Therefore,
Ml has been adjusted for real income changes.17
of 30.8 p.c. The different results are probably due to differences concerning
the test period and the specification of the demand for money function. We
will discuss this question later on. In this context, the main purpose of .the
calculations is to demonstrate how inflation tax revenues depend on private
non-banks behaviour, not to produce a policy guideline.
Sjaastad (1982) has shown that even under steady state conditions unstable
inflation rates yield more revenues than a stable one. The concept of the re-
venue maximizing rate of inflation becomes more blurred when we allow for
lags and take into account adjustment processes. What is crucial in the cur-
rent context is that the government's capital gains from inflationary public
finance are realized before the tax revenues accrue. If the process starts
with a low rate of inflation the government may increase the rate of monetary
expansion and consume an amount of goods and services that is larger than
the inflation tax revenue during that period. Unless the change in money
growth is fully anticipated by the public it will take some time until the rate
of inflation has adjusted to the higher rate of monetary expansion. As long as
the rate of inflation has not risen by the same amount as the rate of growth
of the money stock both are better off, the government and the private sec-
tor. The government continues to realize capital gains, although at a declin-
ing rate. The private sector experiences income advances which are higher
than the growth rate of potential output, due to high government demand.
However, because of excess demand inflation will accelerate, real income gains
will disappear and the real money balances will be adjusted to the increase in
opportunity costs. Although inflation tax revenues now accrue at an acceler-
ating rate, the realization of capital gains by the public sector decreases. At
the same time, revenues from ordinary taxes tend to dry up because in view
of high inflation, firms and private households try to delay tax payments as
long as possible in order to realize a capital gain. While the budget deficit
widens, it becomes more difficult for the government to obtain additional re-
venues by accelerating monetary expansion because the public learns to anti-
cipate the increase of the money stock.
In this situation, the government will feel the need to launch a stabilization
program. The plan has to include some drastic measures, e.g. a price and
wage freeze or a cut of public expenditures, in order to achieve an immediate
reduction in the public's inflation expectation. The stabilization measures will
find public support because some inflation tax relief is urgently needed.
Thus, if the government can establish some credibility with the public it may18
succeed in bringing about an exogeneous change in people's expectation con-
cerning inflation. Whereas the success of the inflation tax in terms of high
revenues hinges on the lagged adjustment of inflation, the success of the sta-
bilization plan depends on a quick reduction of inflationary expectations. The
demand for real money balances will increase only when the public can be
convinced that considerably lower rates of inflation will prevail in the future.
After some time, when the depressed state of the economy becomes a matter
of concern there will be new scope for the government to increase expendi-
tures. During the low inflation period the government may turn to.the credit
market at first to finance the deficit. But sooner or later it is likely to
expand the money stock in excess of the actual rate of inflation in order to
realize capital gains and to reduce the real debt by subsequent inflation.
A government may be able to fool all the people some of the time but one
might question whether this is possible repeatedly or for longer periods. Ex-
perience suggests on the one hand that there is some scope for such policies,
because by changing the government or the administration the credibility of
stabilization plans may be enhanced and because intergenerational transfer of
knowledge seems to be imperfect (Laidler, 1982). On the other hand, history
has shown that the extensive and persistent use of inflationary public finance
is a secure way to produce a flight from the domestic currency. Apart from
the attempt to economize money balances people turn increasingly to barter
trade and try to convert their financial assets into real goods, e.g. real
estate, and into assets denominated in a currency which is considered to be
more inflation-proof. These observations are not incompatible with the hypoth-
esis that the demand for real money balances is a stable function of a few
variables. However, they underline that the statement does not necessarily
refer exclusively to the money issued by the domestic Central Bank. In an
inflationary environment other currencies or currency substitutes will be used
instead of domestic money. Money may be replaced by a great variety of
goods. The use of cigarettes as money substitutes in Germany after World War
II is an extreme example. Currency substitution occurs first of all in those
cases where money is used as a store of value. In addition foreign currency
is likely to be required for transactions in those goods which are held to
shelter savings from inflation (real estate, gold, etc.). Thus, domestic money
on which the inflation tax is levied is replaced by other kinds of money which
are exempted from the inflation tax, i.e. the function representing the de-
mand for domestic money is shifted to a position closer to the origin.19
From Figure 4 it can be seen that the shift of the demand function from m
D °
to m, has implications for the revenue-maximizing inflation rate and for the
D inflation tax revenues. For m the revenue-maximizing inflation rate is p and
inflation tax revenues are m • p" . After the shift the revenue maximizing
rate increases to p, and the corresponding inflation tax revenues m, • p, are
smaller than for m . This shows that after the adjustment of the demand for
real cash balances to higher inflation the government has to accept more in-
flation than before to exploit the inflation tax, while in spite of this higher
inflation tax revenues are lower.





The unwillingness to hold the domestic current intensifies inflationary pres-
sures and accelerates the devaluation of the domestic currency. Therefore the
government will intervene to stop this process. In order to maintain the basis
for the inflation tax it will turn to capital controls and abolish the conver-
tibility of the domestic currency. As the government is interested in prevent-
ing import price increases from, accelerating domestic inflation it is likely to
introduce steps designed to stabilize the exchange rate. Black markets emerge
and unofficial foreign currency transactions are condemned as speculation and
are blamed for the high rate of inflation. In fact, the process of substituting
foreign money for domestic money contributes to the depreciation of the do-
mestic currency. However, it is neither a cause of inflation nor an indication
that inflation is self-generating but only a consequence of prohibitively high
costs of holding domestic money.
Over the last 15 years Argentina seems to have been a laboratory for such
policies. Inflation has been high and has tended to be extremely unstable.
Government administrations have been changed frequently - ministers of the
economy have been in office for less than one year on average - in an at-
tempt to obtain new credibility, and foreign exchange transactions have been
severely regulated before and after the Martinez de Hoz period. A look at the
scatter diagram in Figure 3 shows in more technical terms how the public has
reacted to persistently high rates of inflation. The points in the diagram are
combinations of real money balances and inflation for each year from 1970 to
1984. A closer inspection of the distribution of the points reveals that the
combinations for the years from 1970 to 1974 are clustered around the upper,
steeper part of the curve whereas the remaining points are distributed around
the flat part of the curve. This indicates that during the inflation outburst in
the mid-70s the demand for money function shifted closer to the origin and to
a flatter position. Therefore the regression line in Figure 3 does not re-
present a "true" demand for money function but rather an average of two
functions which can only yield an average of the revenue maximizing rates of
inflation.
Economic policy and economy performance of this period are reviewed in de-
tail by Fischer, Hiemenz and Trapp (1984).21
An estimation of demand for money functions for two subperiods yields the
following results:
1970-1974: Ml =163,1 -22,2 In p R
2 = 0,79
(8,52) (-4,14) DW = 1,36
1976-1984: Ml = 110,2 - 13,7 In p R
2 = 0,74
(4,91) (-3,21) DW = 1,81
The coefficients differ in the expected way; the revenue-maximizing rate of
inflation is 18.7 p.c. in the first period and 26.4 p.c. in the second period.
Inflation tax revenues are higher in the second period. However this does not
mean that the government is better off after the shift of the demand for
money function. First, revenues would have been even higher if the function
had shifted less, e.g., if the function in Figure 3 was valid. Second, the
estimated relationship does not represent a long term position of the demand
for money function. On the contrary, under persistently high inflation the
function will stiff further to positions yielding less revenues at still higher
rates of inflation.
Fernandez and Rodriguez (1984) have compared the revenue maximizing rates
of inflation and the respective amounts of revenues for hyperinflations in dif-
ferent countries (Table 5). Obviously there is a negative relation between the
revenue-maximizing rate of inflation and the amount of revenues. This is not
accidental but appears to have something to do with the inflation experience
of the country. In Austria, Germany and Hungary (after World War I) hyper-
inflation was a new experience at that time, therefore relatively large inflation
tax revenues could be mobilized at relatively low inflation rates. In countries,
however, which have been plagued by high inflation forlong periods, the rev-
enue-maximizing rate of inflation is relatively high and the corresponding
yield in terms of GDP is meagre. This indicates that in economies such as
Argentina with a long history of high inflation, people have "successfully"
learned to largely avoid the inflation tax. However, this does not mean that
the economic costs of inflation are negligible.22
Table 5 - Revenue-Maximizing Rates of Inflation and Revenues
Countr Revenue-maximizing Revenues in
rate of inflation per cent of GDP
Austria 12 26




Hungary (after World War II) 32 7
Poland 54 4
Russia 39 1
Source; Fernandez and Rodriguez, 1984.
The Economic Costs of Inflationary Public Finance
Although the public might manage to reduce or to substitute the use of do-
mestic money and thus be able to avoid the inflation tax, this does not mean
that the detrimental effects of financial repression have been overcome; on
the contrary, the adjustment to high inflation is costly and keeps real income
at a lower level than otherwise would have been the case. Three kinds of
economic costs may be distinguished.
First, the reduction of real cash balances implies a welfare loss for the
economy in the form of the services of money foregone. More resources, i.e.
real capital and labor, have to be employed to ensure a smooth execution of
financial transactions. In addition, lower cash balances produced by the high
cost of holding money mean less independence in short-run financial disposi-
tions and a higher risk of being insolvent. Thus, the (net)utility that the
public derives from holding highly liquid assets is reduced.23
Second, high and unstable inflation rates discourage domestic savings and
lead to a shortening of maturities in financial markets. In fact, the capital
market has virtually disappeared in Argentina. Furthermore, the depth of the
financial sector has suffered grossly from inflation. Compared to countries
like Brazil and South Korea, which in per-capita income terms rank below Ar-
gentina, the deposit-income ratio is at a very low level (Fischer and Trapp,
1985a). One reason for the decline of financial markets may be that the risk
of capital losses as a result of inflation rate variations is considered to be too
high by savers as well as by lenders. If this were true a large scale indexa-
tion of financial contracts should bring about a recovery of financial markets
and a lengthening of maturities. However, while indexation can eliminate the
risk of changing inflation rates, it cannot neutralize the effect of those
government interventions which are bound to occur when the government sys-
tematically exploits the inflation tax, e.g., severe restrictions on the use of
foreign exchange or a partial or full-scale price freeze in an attempt to en-
hance the use of the domestic currency. The risk that the convertibility of
financial assets will be reduced or abolished or that relative prices will be
distorted makes investors prefer very short-term assets or projects. In Ar-
gentina, the acceleration of inflation from 1980 to 1984 was accompanied by a
fall of gross investment by about 50 p.c; the share of investment in GDP
declined from more than 20 p.c. to less than 10 p.c. Thus, domestic capital
formation has been severely impeded by the uncertainty produced by financial
repression.
Third, the distributional effects of the inflation tax produce considerable
macroeconomic costs. High and medium income earners have more possibilities
to evade the inflation tax than low income earners. Those who are able to
save may exchange their Pesos in the black market. It is estimated that some
5 bill. $ are hoarded in Argentina and that Argentine residents hold about 30
bill.$ in US bank accounts. Since there is no incentive to repatriate part of
the capital or capital earnings, domestic savings remain inadequate. The main
tax burden is placed on low income families that are neither able to acquire
US-$ nor to deposit large amounts in interest bearing accounts. Therefore the
inflation tax leads to greater inequality and reduces the opportunities for
social advancement for poor families. As a consequence the potential for social
unrest increases and more energies are spent in conflicts over income distri-
bution.24
It is difficult to quantify these costs of inflationary public finance in terms of
income forgone. Many reasons have been brought forward to explain the poor
performance of the Argentine economy over the last 15 years. The oil price
hikes, high interest rates, the debt problem, and protectionism are only a
few of them. However, other countries, often less well endowed with natural
resources than Argentina, have fared much better although they were ex-
posed to similar shocks. Compared to some other Latin American or Asian
countries the economic situation in Argentina has deteriorated dramatically.
Brazil and Mexico, e.g., with a per capita income half as high as in Argen-
tina in 1970 have caught up with Argentina (Fischer, Hiemenz and Trapp
1984: 17 pp.). Thus, while one cannot exclude that other shocks have led to
frictions and temporary income losses, it seems to be fairly obvious that the
economy would have been able to digest these shocks had it not been for the
detrimental impact of domestic policies which undermined the strength of the
economy and are the prime cause for the dismal economic performance of Ar-
gentina over the last 15 years.
Policy Options
Any attempt to reestablish the functioning of the financial sector and to stop
financial repression must include a strategy of disinflation and a deregulation
at the same time. For a credible anti-inflation policy it is first and above all
necessary to cut the public sector deficit drastically in order to reduce the
deficit-induced expansion of the monetary base.
In June 1985 the government announced a new stabilization plan. The mea-
sures include a wage and price freeze and the introduction of a new currency
(Austral) with a fixed exchange rate vis-d-vis the US-$. Furthermore the
government intends to reduce the public sector deficit to 2.5 p.c. of GDP in
the second half of 1985. Unfortunately as to the last measure, which should
be the most important part of the whole plan, the announcements remain very
vague. The lack of immediate expenditure cuts reduces the credibility of the
plan as a whole, since without such action the introduction of a new money
For a more detailed discussion of a stabilization cum restructuring plan and
of the rationale of such a program see Fischer, Hiemenz and Trapp (1984:
35 pp.).25
constitutes only a currency change but not a currency reform. Doubts seem
also be warranted because interest rates have been fixed at a level which at
present inflationary expectations implies a heavy subsidization of lenders. It
is true there is a price freeze. However, this is by no means sufficient to
unwind inflationary pressures. Indeed, before the plan was implemented
inflation rates rose above 1000 p.c. per annum in spite of price controls. In
addition, production and investment incentives have been further reduced by
an increase of export taxes.
All in all, there is little evidence that the new stabilization plan will be more
effective than previous ones. Indeed, given the measures taken so far the
risk of a failure appears to be large. Therefore, one can only hope that the
announced reduction of the budget deficit will follow soon and that by this
the chances for a revitalization of the Argentine economy will be improved.26
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